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8 avril 2015 3 08 /04 /avril /2015 18:20

Israël


- Muslims relentlessly hound Jews touring Temple Mount (Elder of Ziyon) - "Usually the crowds of screaming Muslim women have been concentrated around the southern part of the Temple Mount, near the Al Aqsa mosque. This time they followed and hounded the Jews, including children, all around the perimeter. The screams and chants have a secondary effect: they ensure that the Jewish tour guides cannot be heard as they describe the majesty and importance of the sacred spot to the respectful visitors". Voir la vidéo ici.
http://elderofziyon.blogspot.fr/2015/04/muslims-relentlessly-hound-jews-touring.html

- Combatting Claims of Israeli Apartheid, David Zonshayn (Washington Square News)
http://www.algemeiner.com/2015/04/03/combatting-claims-of-israeli-apartheid/
"[...] Israel is factually, morally and historically not an apartheid state. Arabs — about 20 percent of Israel’s population — are an active part of Israeli government, culture and economics. They vote, have political parties represented in the Knesset and occupy seats in the Supreme Court. Just last year an Arab judge, Selim Joubran, headed the appeal that sentenced Israel’s former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to six years in prison for corruption. In last week’s elections, the United Arab List became Israel’s third largest party. In 2007, Israel had an interim Muslim Arab president, Majalli Wahaba. All Israelis – regardless of race, creed or orientation – are accorded equal rights under the law. Arabs lie alongside Jews in Israeli hospitals and are professors and students at top Israeli universities. Even F.W. De Klerk, South Africa’s reformer, decried the Israel apartheid analogy as slander. When it comes to religious pluralism, Israel is more accepting than any other country in the Middle East and many Christian countries worldwide.
Proponents of the Israel apartheid myth will point to what they call the “apartheid wall” that separates Israel proper from the West Bank. It is really a security barrier similar to the fence that separates Mexico from the United States. To call the barrier an “apartheid wall” is to distort the truth. SJP [Students for Justice in Palestine] neglects to mention that prior to the completion of the barrier in 2006, members of the Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were murdering Jews in pizzerias, buses, bars and nightclubs. Before the construction of the barrier there were 452 fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2002 alone. By 2010 the number of deaths fell to nine. [...]"

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Judée-Samarie

- Deux soldats israéliens attaqués au couteau en Cisjordanie, leur agresseur palestinien tué (Le Monde.fr) - "Une autre attaque au couteau s'était produite jeudi dernier".
http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2015/04/08/un-soldat-israelien-poignarde-en-cisjordanie_4611295_3218.html
"Un Palestinien a poignardé deux soldats israéliens, mercredi 8 avril, dans le nord de la Cisjordanie, a indiqué une source de sécurité. L'un a été « sérieusement blessé au cou », l'autre a été légèrement touché. Ce dernier a immédiatement répliqué et tué leur agresseur de deux balles dans la tête, selon des sources médicales palestiniennes. Il s'agit de la deuxième attaque au couteau de soldats israéliens en une semaine.
Les deux militaires, âgés d'une vingtaine d'années, appartenant à une unité médicale de la défense civile, étaient postés en attente dans une ambulance pour renforcer le dispositif de sécurité près de la [localité juive] de Shilo, sur la route 60, l'axe principal reliant les villes palestiniennes de Ramallah et de Naplouse, pendant la Pâque juive, qui s'achève en fin de semaine. Selon un communiqué des services d'urgence, le soldat « touché dans le haut du corps », a été évacué vers un hôpital de Jérusalem « dans un état grave ». [...]"
https://fr.news.yahoo.com/deux-isra%C3%A9liens-bless%C3%A9s-agresseur-palestinien-tu%C3%A9-cisjordanie-092528339.html
"[...] Une autre attaque au couteau s'était produite jeudi dernier lorsqu'un Palestinien avait poignardé et légèrement blessé un soldat israélien qui avait tenté de l'empêcher de s'introduire en Israël en franchissant la barrière de sécurité à l'ouest de Naplouse. Le Palestinien avait été arrêté, selon l'armée. [...]"

- BBC again avoids informing audiences about PA debt to Israel (BBC Watch) - "In addition to its debt to the IEC [compagnie d'électricité], the Palestinian Authority has also incurred significant debts to the Israeli water company Mekorot (16.7 million shekels as of May 2014) and to Israeli hospitals in which Palestinians have been given medical treatment (34 million shekels as of May 2014)".
http://bbcwatch.org/2015/04/06/bbc-again-avoids-informing-audiences-about-pa-debt-to-israel/


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"Processus de paix"

- Mother of Martyr: We ululate since “our child is going... to marry the Dark-Eyed Virgins” (Official PA TV, 21 mars, Vidéo 1mn03)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7NnOp_8vukc
"- A Martyr’s mother: "We say ‘praise Allah’ for everything. It's our duty to give ourselves and our children [to the cause]. Praise Allah, it's true that this hurts and that we feel agony and pain. Today, every day and every moment, I miss my son. I'll never forget my son. It's true what they say that we ululate (i.e., make sounds of joy) for our [dead] children because our child is going to Heaven to marry the Dark-Eyed Virgins, Allah willing. May Allah make a dwelling for him in the highest Paradise. It’s not that we don't love our children. We do love our children, but also our homeland. We say ‘Allah willing’ and maintain our resolve..."
- General Union of Palestine Workers Widad Manawil: "We tell all women to learn from the resolve of Palestinian women, from the one bidding her Martyr son farewell and the one welcoming her prisoner son with ululations"."


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Accord nucléaire iranien

- La reconnaissance d’Israël ne fera pas partie de l'accord sur le nucléaire iranien (AFP)
http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2015/04/07/la-reconnaissance-d-israel-ne-fera-pas-partie-de-l-accord-sur-le-nucleaire-iranien_4610516_3218.html
"Le président américain, Barack Obama, a estimé, lundi 6 avril, que demander à l'Iran de reconnaître l'Etat d'Israël dans le cadre de l'accord naissant sur son programme nucléaire serait une « erreur de jugement fondamentale ». Au lendemain de l'annonce de l'accord d'étape, le premier ministre israélien, Benyamin Netanyahou, avait exigé que tout accord final comporte la reconnaissance « claire et sans ambiguïté » par la République islamique du droit à l'existence d'Israël.
Barack Obama, qui a engagé une offensive politique pour convaincre le Congrès de lui laisser les mains libres jusqu'au 30 juin, date avant laquelle l'accord avec Téhéran doit être finalisé, a indiqué à la radio publique américaine que cette demande va au-delà du cadre des discussions en cours : « Dire que nous devrions conditionner le fait que l'Iran n'acquiert pas l'arme nucléaire à un accord vérifiable dans lequel l'Iran reconnaîtrait Israël, cela revient à dire que nous ne signerons aucun accord, à moins que la nature du régime iranien ne change complètement. Et c'est, je pense, une erreur de jugement fondamentale. »
Il a également ajouté que l'Iran devait cesser de menacer Israël et de s'immiscer dans des conflits au Moyen-Orient, mais a tenu à séparer le rôle de Téhéran dans la région et l'accord de principe conclu jeudi dernier : « Nous ne souhaitons pas que l'Iran se dote de l'arme atomique justement parce que nous ne pouvons pas anticiper la nature du changement du régime. Si soudain l'Iran se transformait en pays comme l'Allemagne, la Suède ou la France, alors il y aurait des discussions d'une autre nature sur ses infrastructures nucléaires. » [...]"

- Sanctions contre l'Iran rétablies en cas d'échec, promet Obama (Reuters) - ""Nous sommes tout à fait certains que nous pouvons les rétablir", affirme Barack Obama à propos des sanctions qui ont fortement affecté l'économie iranienne. Pour ce faire, il suffirait que l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) constate un manquement de l'Iran à ses obligations dans son programme nucléaire".
https://fr.news.yahoo.com/sanctions-contre-liran-r%C3%A9tablies-en-cas-d%C3%A9chec-promet-115519032.html

- Israël pose 10 questions sur les "concessions irresponsables" faites à l'Iran (i24)
http://www.i24news.tv/fr/actu/israel/diplomatie-defense/66827-150406-israel-pose-10-questions-sur-les-concessions-irresponsables-faites-a-l-iran
"[...] Faisant écho aux critiques formulées par Netanyahou, le document dénonce le fait que "pas une seule installation nucléaire ne sera fermée. L'Iran sera autorisé à poursuivre ses recherches avancées avec ses centrifugeuse, et [la question de] son ​​programme de missile balistique intercontinental reste sans réponse". Le document inclut également dix questions qui pointent les décisions (ainsi que les non-décisions) prises par les négociateurs :
1. Pourquoi les sanctions, dont la mise en place a nécessité tant d'années seront levées immédiatement (comme le prétend les Iraniens) ? Ceci enlèverait à la communauté internationale son principal levier, et rendrait moins probable le respect de l'accord par l'Iran.
2. Étant donné les antécédents de l'Iran sur la dissimulation de ses activités nucléaires illicites, pourquoi l'accord-cadre n'exige pas explicitement que l'Iran accepte des inspections de toutes ses installations, soupçonnées de développer l'arme nucléaire ?
3. Est-ce que l'Iran sera un jour forcé de venir nettoyer autour de son activité passée l'armement nucléaire ?
4. Quel sera le sort de la réserve d'uranium enrichi que l'Iran a enrichi ?
5. Pourquoi l'Iran est-il autorisé à poursuivre ses programmes de recherche sur des centrifugeuses beaucoup plus avancées que ceux qui sont actuellement en sa possession ?
6. Pourquoi l'accord cadre ne traite pas du programme de missile balistique intercontinental de l'Iran, dont le seul but est de transporter des charges nucléaires ?
7. Si l'Iran viole l'accord, quelle sera l'efficacité réelle du mécanisme de rétablissement des sanctions ?
8. Quel message l’accord-cadre envoie aux Etats dans la région et dans le monde, quand celui-ci offre des concessions d'une telle envergure à un régime qui pendant des années a défié les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité ? En quoi cela n'encouragerait-il pas la prolifération nucléaire ?
9. L'accord-cadre semble avoir beaucoup de points communs avec l'accord nucléaire conclu avec la Corée du Nord. En quoi cet accord diffère-t-il du cas nord-coréen ? [NB : la Corée du Nord est parvenue à posséder l'arme atomique malgré les accords signés.]
10. Pourquoi la levée des restrictions sur le programme nucléaire de l'Iran dans une dizaine d'années ne dépend pas d'un changement du comportement de l'Iran ? Selon l’accord, l'Iran peut rester le principal sponsor du terrorisme dans le monde, tout en étant affranchi de toutes les restrictions qui lui sont imposées.
Le document du gouvernement israélien estime qu’il est indispensable de parvenir à "un meilleur accord" qui imposerait le démantèlement, de façon significative, des infrastructures nucléaires iranienne, qui conduirait à l'arrêt effectif de ses agressions dans la région et de ses activités terroristes dans le monde, qui mettrait fin à ses menaces de destruction Israël."

- The Iran Deal and Its Consequences, Henry Kissinger & George P. Shultz (former secretaries of state) - "Mixing shrewd diplomacy with defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has turned the negotiation on its head". Une excellente tribune, très claire et pertinente, par deux anciens (et célèbres) secrétaires d'Etat.
http://www.wsj.com/article_email/the-iran-deal-and-its-consequences-1428447582-lMyQjAxMTE1NjA5NzMwMzc2Wj
"[...] For 20 years, three presidents of both major parties proclaimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon was contrary to American and global interests—and that they were prepared to use force to prevent it. Yet negotiations that began 12 years ago as an international effort to prevent an Iranian capability to develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with an agreement that concedes this very capability, albeit short of its full capacity in the first 10 years.
Mixing shrewd diplomacy with open defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has gradually turned the negotiation on its head. Iran’s centrifuges have multiplied from about 100 at the beginning of the negotiation to almost 20,000 today. The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran. While Iran treated the mere fact of its willingness to negotiate as a concession, the West has felt compelled to break every deadlock with a new proposal. In the process, the Iranian program has reached a point officially described as being within two to three months of building a nuclear weapon. Under the proposed agreement, for 10 years Iran will never be further than one year from a nuclear weapon and, after a decade, will be significantly closer. [...]
Negotiating the final agreement will be extremely challenging. For one thing, no official text has yet been published. The so-called framework represents a unilateral American interpretation. Some of its clauses have been dismissed by the principal Iranian negotiator as “spin.” A joint EU-Iran statement differs in important respects, especially with regard to the lifting of sanctions and permitted research and development.
Comparable ambiguities apply to the one-year window for a presumed Iranian breakout. Emerging at a relatively late stage in the negotiation, this concept replaced the previous baseline—that Iran might be permitted a technical capacity compatible with a plausible civilian nuclear program. The new approach complicates verification and makes it more political because of the vagueness of the criteria.
Under the new approach, Iran permanently gives up none of its equipment, facilities or fissile product to achieve the proposed constraints. It only places them under temporary restriction and safeguard—amounting in many cases to a seal at the door of a depot or periodic visits by inspectors to declared sites. The physical magnitude of the effort is daunting. Is the International Atomic Energy Agency technically, and in terms of human resources, up to so complex and vast an assignment?
In a large country with multiple facilities and ample experience in nuclear concealment, violations will be inherently difficult to detect. Devising theoretical models of inspection is one thing. Enforcing compliance, week after week, despite competing international crises and domestic distractions, is another. Any report of a violation is likely to prompt debate over its significance—or even calls for new talks with Tehran to explore the issue. The experience of Iran’s work on a heavy-water reactor during the “interim agreement” period—when suspect activity was identified but played down in the interest of a positive negotiating atmosphere—is not encouraging.
Compounding the difficulty is the unlikelihood that breakout will be a clear-cut event. More likely it will occur, if it does, via the gradual accumulation of ambiguous evasions. When inevitable disagreements arise over the scope and intrusiveness of inspections, on what criteria are we prepared to insist and up to what point? If evidence is imperfect, who bears the burden of proof? What process will be followed to resolve the matter swiftly?
The agreement’s primary enforcement mechanism, the threat of renewed sanctions, emphasizes a broad-based asymmetry, which provides Iran permanent relief from sanctions in exchange for temporary restraints on Iranian conduct. Undertaking the “snap-back” of sanctions is unlikely to be as clear or as automatic as the phrase implies. Iran is in a position to violate the agreement by executive decision. Restoring the most effective sanctions will require coordinated international action. In countries that had reluctantly joined in previous rounds, the demands of public and commercial opinion will militate against automatic or even prompt “snap-back.” If the follow-on process does not unambiguously define the term, an attempt to reimpose sanctions risks primarily isolating America, not Iran.
The gradual expiration of the framework agreement, beginning in a decade, will enable Iran to become a significant nuclear, industrial and military power after that time—in the scope and sophistication of its nuclear program and its latent capacity to weaponize at a time of its choosing. Limits on Iran’s research and development have not been publicly disclosed (or perhaps agreed). Therefore Iran will be in a position to bolster its advanced nuclear technology during the period of the agreement and rapidly deploy more advanced centrifuges—of at least five times the capacity of the current model—after the agreement expires or is broken.
The follow-on negotiations must carefully address a number of key issues, including the mechanism for reducing Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium from 10,000 to 300 kilograms, the scale of uranium enrichment after 10 years, and the IAEA’s concerns regarding previous Iranian weapons efforts. The ability to resolve these and similar issues should determine the decision over whether or when the U.S. might still walk away from the negotiations.
- The Framework Agreement and Long-Term Deterrence
Even when these issues are resolved, another set of problems emerges because the negotiating process has created its own realities. The interim agreement accepted Iranian enrichment; the new agreement makes it an integral part of the architecture. For the U.S., a decade-long restriction on Iran’s nuclear capacity is a possibly hopeful interlude. For Iran’s neighbors—who perceive their imperatives in terms of millennial rivalries—it is a dangerous prelude to an even more dangerous permanent fact of life. Some of the chief actors in the Middle East are likely to view the U.S. as willing to concede a nuclear military capability to the country they consider their principal threat. Several will insist on at least an equivalent capability. Saudi Arabia has signaled that it will enter the lists; others are likely to follow. In that sense, the implications of the negotiation are irreversible.
If the Middle East is “proliferated” and becomes host to a plethora of nuclear-threshold states, several in mortal rivalry with each other, on what concept of nuclear deterrence or strategic stability will international security be based? Traditional theories of deterrence assumed a series of bilateral equations. Do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries, with each new nuclear program counterbalancing others in the region?
Previous thinking on nuclear strategy also assumed the existence of stable state actors. Among the original nuclear powers, geographic distances and the relatively large size of programs combined with moral revulsion to make surprise attack all but inconceivable. How will these doctrines translate into a region where sponsorship of nonstate proxies is common, the state structure is under assault, and death on behalf of jihad is a kind of fulfillment?
Some have suggested the U.S. can dissuade Iran’s neighbors from developing individual deterrent capacities by extending an American nuclear umbrella to them. But how will these guarantees be defined? What factors will govern their implementation? Are the guarantees extended against the use of nuclear weapons—or against any military attack, conventional or nuclear? Is it the domination by Iran that we oppose or the method for achieving it? What if nuclear weapons are employed as psychological blackmail? And how will such guarantees be expressed, or reconciled with public opinion and constitutional practices?
- Regional Order
For some, the greatest value in an agreement lies in the prospect of an end, or at least a moderation, of Iran’s 3½ decades of militant hostility to the West and established international institutions, and an opportunity to draw Iran into an effort to stabilize the Middle East. Having both served in government during a period of American-Iranian strategic alignment and experienced its benefits for both countries as well as the Middle East, we would greatly welcome such an outcome. Iran is a significant national state with a historic culture, a fierce national identity, and a relatively youthful, educated population; its re-emergence as a partner would be a consequential event.
But partnership in what task? Cooperation is not an exercise in good feeling; it presupposes congruent definitions of stability. There exists no current evidence that Iran and the U.S. are remotely near such an understanding. Even while combating common enemies, such as ISIS, Iran has declined to embrace common objectives. Iran’s representatives (including its Supreme Leader) continue to profess a revolutionary anti-Western concept of international order; domestically, some senior Iranians describe nuclear negotiations as a form of jihad by other means.
The final stages of the nuclear talks have coincided with Iran’s intensified efforts to expand and entrench its power in neighboring states. Iranian or Iranian client forces are now the pre-eminent military or political element in multiple Arab countries, operating beyond the control of national authorities. With the recent addition of Yemen as a battlefield, Tehran occupies positions along all of the Middle East’s strategic waterways and encircles archrival Saudi Arabia, an American ally. Unless political restraint is linked to nuclear restraint, an agreement freeing Iran from sanctions risks empowering Iran’s hegemonic efforts.
Some have argued that these concerns are secondary, since the nuclear deal is a way station toward the eventual domestic transformation of Iran. But what gives us the confidence that we will prove more astute at predicting Iran’s domestic course than Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, Iraq’s, Syria’s, Egypt’s or Libya’s?
Absent the linkage between nuclear and political restraint, America’s traditional allies will conclude that the U.S. has traded temporary nuclear cooperation for acquiescence to Iranian hegemony. They will increasingly look to create their own nuclear balances and, if necessary, call in other powers to sustain their integrity. Does America still hope to arrest the region’s trends toward sectarian upheaval, state collapse and the disequilibrium of power tilting toward Tehran, or do we now accept this as an irremediable aspect of the regional balance? [...]
Until clarity on an American strategic political concept is reached, the projected nuclear agreement will reinforce, not resolve, the world’s challenges in the region. Rather than enabling American disengagement from the Middle East, the nuclear framework is more likely to necessitate deepening involvement there—on complex new terms. History will not do our work for us; it helps only those who seek to help themselves."

- Ex-IAEA deputy: Deal puts Iran on nuke threshold for 10 years, then gets worse (Times of Israel) - "Olli Heinonen tells Times of Israel one-year breakout warning may be insufficient; says deceptive Tehran must come clean on whole program".
http://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-iaea-deputy-deal-puts-iran-on-nuke-threshold-for-10-years-then-gets-worse/

- 839 ‘oeuvres’ exposées en Iran pour le concours de caricatures sur la Shoah (Times of Israel) - "Le concours a été annoncé en janvier en réponse au soutien international qu’a provoqué l’attaque contre les bureaux du magazine satirique Charlie Hebdo par des islamistes qui se seraient sentis insultés par la représentation de Mahomet dans cette hebdomadaire".
http://fr.timesofisrael.com/le-concours-de-caricature-sur-la-shoah-a-attire-839-entrees/


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Syrie

- Palestinians trapped dying in Yarmouk, Syria – a test for the left, Bradley Burston (Haaretz) - "If, as progressives, we truly care about injustices done to Palestinians, if our goal as leftists goes beyond expressing fury toward Israel, we must raise our voices every bit as forcefully, right now, to try to help the people of Yarmouk".
http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/a-special-place-in-hell/1.650850


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Monde arabe

- Yémen : plus de 540 tués, 1.700 blessés depuis le 19 mars (AFP) - "De son côté, un porte-parole du Fonds des Nations unies pour l'enfance (Unicef), Christophe Boulierac, a indiqué qu'"au moins 74 enfants ont été tués et 44 blessés depuis le 26 mars". Mais l'organisation considère "que le nombre d'enfants tués est beaucoup plus élevé", a-t-il ajouté".
https://fr.news.yahoo.com/y%C3%A9men-540-tu%C3%A9s-1-700-bless%C3%A9s-depuis-19-093354097.html
- At least 77 children killed so far since Saudi started bombing Yemen. Did you miss the headlines? (Elder of Ziyon) - "Shiite media report that over 180 children have been killed, although for some reason the world media is ignoring what they say, unlike how they treat Hamas ministry pronouncements".
http://elderofziyon.blogspot.fr/2015/04/at-least-77-children-killed-so-far.html
"[...] Shiite media report that over 180 children have been killed, although for some reason the world media is ignoring what they say, unlike how they treat Hamas ministry pronouncements.
This has not exactly been front-page news. It must mean that when an American ally, using American weapons, is killing Arab children while fighting an Islamist terror group that staged a violent coup next door, it is not worth highlighting.
And the reporting that is done must never say the words "war crimes," "indiscriminate bombings," or "disproportionate response." And we must never see photos of the injured and dead children accompanying these reports, nor should we see personal stories about how terrified the civilians are and how their houses are destroyed. There may be exceptions to these rules based on the majority religion of the country doing the bombing, though."
- Comparing BBC coverage of civilian casualties in Yemen and Gaza (BBC Watch) - "what caused BBC reporting on civilian casualties in the first week of conflict in Yemen to be so different from its reporting on the first week of last summer’s conflict in Israel and the Gaza Strip and why are audiences not reading or hearing the same amateur opinions on ‘international law’ or accusations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, collective punishment and deliberate targeting of civilians?"
http://bbcwatch.org/2015/04/03/comparing-bbc-coverage-of-civilian-casualties-in-yemen-and-gaza/
"As readers no doubt recall, within twenty-four hours of the commencement of Operation Protective Edge in July 2014, the BBC had begun promoting the theme of ‘Israeli war crimes’. In the first week of the conflict, BBC audiences were also told that Israel deliberately targeted civilians and heard claims of ‘collective punishment’ and a ‘disproportionate’ Israeli response to the actions of terrorist organisations in the Gaza Strip. Throughout the BBC’s coverage of the seven week-long hostilities, the topic of civilian casualties was by far the most prominent with thousands of words and hours of air-time devoted to emotive reporting of the plight of civilians in the Gaza Strip and Hamas-supplied casualty figures quoted unquestioningly.
Six days after the commencement of airstrikes on Yemen on March 26th by the Saudi Arabian-led coalition, the UN estimated that almost a hundred civilians had been killed and some 364 injured. The actual figure can be reasonably assumed to be higher by now.
The BBC has to date refrained from ‘parachuting in’ to Yemen star reporters such as Lyse Doucet and Jeremy Bowen as it did during last summer’s conflict in Israel and the Gaza Strip and it is interesting to ponder the question of whether the corporation’s reporting on civilian casualties in Yemen is affected by that fact.
In an article titled “Saudi Arabia launches air strikes in Yemen” published on the BBC News website on March 26th readers were informed that: “A civil defence source told the AFP news agency that 13 civilians were killed when seven homes near the al-Dulaimi air base were destroyed. The Houthis’ al-Masirah TV quoted the health ministry as putting the death toll at 18.”
The BBC refrained from making any pronunciations with regard to the legality of the airstrikes or their ‘proportionality’. Likewise, no accompanying claims of ‘deliberate targeting of civilians’ appeared in the BBC’s March 28th article titled “Yemen crisis: Saudis lead fresh air strikes on Houthis” which informed readers that: “Since the air campaign began, at least 39 civilians – including six children under the age of 10 – have been killed, Yemen health ministry officials say.”
An article titled “Yemen crisis: Dozens killed by ‘air strike’ near refugee camp” published on March 30th was guarded in its presentation of information not independently verified by the BBC. “An air strike has killed at least 40 people at a refugee camp in northwest Yemen, aid workers have said. State media said Saudi planes were responsible, but the Yemeni foreign minister said “artillery strikes” by Houthi rebels were to blame.”
An article published on April 1st under the title “Yemen crisis: Blast at Hudaydah factory ‘kills 35′” also presented the story in cautious language, acknowledging that the causes of incidents are not always immediately clear. [...]
So what caused BBC reporting on civilian casualties in the first week of conflict in Yemen to be so different from its reporting on the first week of last summer’s conflict in Israel and the Gaza Strip and why are audiences not reading or hearing the same amateur opinions on ‘international law’ or accusations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, collective punishment and deliberate targeting of civilians?
The all too obvious answer to those questions is that in this case the BBC’s correspondents are not focused on promoting a pre-existing politically motivated narrative and amplifying unquestioned and unchallenged messaging from NGOs with a similar political world view to that held by visiting journalists. Instead, they are reporting the news."

- « Les milices zaïdites sont derrière ces montagnes, prêtes à nous tirer dessus », Benjamin Barthe (Le Monde) - "Une dizaine de hameaux en lisière de la frontière, dont la population avait été évacuée en 2009, ont été rasés, de peur qu’ils ne servent de planque à des houtistes infiltrés. Quatre-vingt autres devraient connaître le même sort dans les prochaines semaines". Quelle couverture médiatique si c'était Israël qui avait rasé près d'une centaine de "hameaux" au-delà de ses frontières ?
http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2015/04/07/les-milices-zaidites-sont-derriere-ces-montagnes-pretes-a-nous-tirer-dessus_4610762_3218.html

- Le réveil de l’Arabie saoudite face à l’Iran, Benjamin Barthe (Le Monde) - "Même le Soudan, qu’on disait proche de l’Iran, a rejoint le front anti-Téhéran, une coalition arabe d’une ampleur jamais vue depuis la guerre de 1973 contre Israël".
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2015/04/07/le-reveil-de-l-arabie-saoudite-face-a-l-iran_4610715_3210.html
"[...] Hormis dans le minuscule archipel de Bahreïn, où ses troupes avaient maté en 2011 le mouvement de contestation à dominante chiite de la dynastie des Khalifa, l’Arabie saoudite assistait sans broncher ou presque à l’extension du domaine de l’Iran : au Liban, où ses alliés du Hezbollah paralysent le fonctionnement des institutions ; en Syrie, où ses forces et ses fonds maintiennent le régime Assad en état de vie artificielle ; en Irak, où ses milices ont repris du service sous couvert de lutte contre les djihadistes de l’organisation Etat islamique (EI) ; et au Yémen donc, où les houthistes, un mouvement armé issu de la minorité zaïdite (une branche du chiisme) et soutenu par Téhéran, se sont emparés à l’automne de Sanaa, forçant le président élu, Abed Rabo Mansour Hadi, à prendre la fuite.
Mais l’avènement du roi Salman, en janvier, épaulé par deux ministres de la deuxième génération aux caractères bien trempés, son fils Mohamed Ben Salman à la défense et son neveu Mohamed Ben Nayef à l’intérieur, a changé la donne. Le 26 mars, en envoyant son aviation bombarder les positions houthistes, le nouveau serviteur des deux mosquées saintes – l’appellation officielle du souverain saoudien – a sonné de facto l’heure du réveil sunnite, de la reconquête. Indifférent au fait que cette offensive puisse nuire aux Etats-Unis, dans l’ultime ligne droite des négociations sur le nucléaire iranien, Riyad a manifesté une autorité inhabituelle, obligeant Washington à bénir les raids après coup.
« Les Saoudiens ont compris qu’ils ne peuvent compter que sur eux-mêmes, décrypte un diplomate occidental en poste en Arabie. Ils ont entrepris de rassembler les puissances sunnites autour d’eux pour contrer l’influence déstabilisatrice de l’Iran. » Dans son sermon de vendredi, l’imam de la grande mosquée de Riyad a insisté sur le fait que l’opération « Tempête décisive », le nom de code de l’intervention au Yémen, a « ramené l’espoir dans l’Oumma », la communauté des croyants.
Même la conclusion de l’accord entre l’Iran et les grandes puissances, jeudi 2 avril à Lausanne, qui pourrait déboucher sur la réintégration dans le concert des nations de leur ennemi juré, n’a pas entamé la nouvelle fierté des Saoudiens. « L’Arabie saoudite a repris le leadership arabe, s’enflamme Abdelaziz Al-Moureidib, un homme d’affaires de Riyad. Cela fait longtemps que je n’avais pas vu mes compatriotes aussi heureux. »
Derrière cette bouffée de nationalisme, alimentée par la propagande d’Etat, Jamal Khashoggi décèle un tournant authentique : l’avènement d’une « doctrine Salman », un interventionnisme anti-iranien, décomplexé, à rebours de l’immobilisme plaintif qui caractérisait ces derniers temps la diplomatie saoudienne. Le roi a gagné à cette théorie Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi, le président de l’Egypte. Sa flotte s’est déployée sur le détroit de Bab Al-Mandeb, voie d’accès au canal de Suez, et a commencé à bombarder Aden, que se disputent pro et anti-Hadi. Non content d’avoir retrouvé le fidèle second qui lui manquait depuis 2011, le roi Salman peut aussi se féliciter d’avoir ramené le Qatar sous sa tutelle et d’avoir réchauffé ses relations avec Ankara. Même le Soudan, qu’on disait proche de l’Iran, a rejoint le front anti-Téhéran, une coalition arabe d’une ampleur jamais vue depuis la guerre de 1973 contre Israël.
Après le Yémen, c’est dans le nucléaire que la « doctrine Salman » pourrait avoir une application concrète. A la mi-mars, Turki Ben Faisal, l’ancien maître espion du royaume, avait prévenu qu’en cas d’accord entre les Occidentaux et l’Iran les monarchies du Golfe réclameraient les mêmes droits que ceux accordés à la République islamique. « Si l’Iran obtient la capacité d’enrichir l’uranium à tel niveau, l’Arabie saoudite demandera la même chose et elle ne sera pas la seule », avait déclaré cet influent membre de la famille royale. [...]"

- It's Passover, so it's blood libel time in Arab media (Elder of Ziyon) - "Lebanon's Slab News has an article by Imad Jabbour saying that he never believed that Jews killed Christians and Muslims to mix their blood in the dough of matzoh until he read about the famous Damascus blood libel of 1840".
http://elderofziyon.blogspot.fr/2015/04/its-passover-so-its-blood-libel-time-in.html


*************************************
France

- L’objectif initial de Coulibaly aurait été une école juive (JTA) - "Une enquête de BFMTV révèle que le terroriste islamiste avait choisi le supermarché suite à l’échec de son premier plan".
http://fr.timesofisrael.com/lobjectif-initial-de-coulibaly-aurait-ete-une-ecole-juive/

- France set to propose new Palestinian state resolution at UN (Ynet) - "The draft would define the pre-1967 borders as a reference point for talks but allow room for exchanges of territory, designate Jerusalem as the capital of both Israel and a Palestinian state and call for a fair solution for Palestinian refugees".
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4645117,00.html
- Blocking the French initiative, Zalman Shoval (Israel Hayom) - "The French apparently believe that after the U.S. administration's talk of "reassessing" the best way to achieve a two-state solution, there is a chance that Washington will allow their proposal to pass this time".
http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=12189
"[...] it is possible that Hollande believes that taking pro-Arab stances on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not hurt his standing locally, especially if the positions are consistent with Paris's approach to the issue since 1967. After all, in 1980, France was the principle drafter of the Venice Declaration, issued by the EU's predecessor, the European Economic Community. It called for the acknowledgement of the Palestinian right to self-determination and the Palestine Liberation Organization's right to be involved in the establishment of a Palestinian state.
In 1967, France opposed the British version of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which was contingent upon Israeli withdrawal from specific territories to determine secure and recognized borders -- instead, the French demanded withdrawal from "all territories." In the same vein, France tried last autumn to initiate a Security Council resolution that would have given new expression to its former demands, regarding both a Palestinian state and its borders, but the attempt was shut down by the United States.
Many articles have appeared of late suggesting that France is looking to renew its initiative, which this time is rumored to include a specific reference to the 1967 "borders" and to Jerusalem as a capital of both states. Not included in the proposal are the cancellation of the Palestinians' claimed right of return and the recognition of Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people.
The French apparently believe that after the U.S. administration's talk of "reassessing" the best way to achieve a two-state solution, there is a chance that Washington will allow their proposal to pass this time, even if the U.S. does not directly support it. Still, it seems that Paris has not made a final decision on the move due, among other reasons, to being unsure of the American stance on the matter.
Israel is also unsure, and that is why the majority of its diplomatic and political activities in the near future should focus on ensuring the continued opposition of the United States to France's troubling initiative -- and it is possible that the Iranian issue will help Israel achieve that goal.
Still, France's balance sheet is not entirely in the negative. It must be noted that when it comes to the Iranian nuclear issue, France takes a much more responsible and determined position than the United States. However, it seems that the French believe there is no contradiction between supporting a Palestinian statehood resolution at the U.N. and exercising caution when it comes to Iran -- yet both affect Israel's security and its future."

- Commentaires du jour sur Le Monde.fr
http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/reactions/2015/04/07/la-reconnaissance-d-israel-ne-fera-pas-partie-de-l-accord-sur-le-nucleaire-iranien_4610516_3218.html
- Alain Pontvert (07/04/2015 - 03h09)
"Petit à petit, Obama et tous les pays civilisés (la France en dernier sans doute tant que nous aurons Hollande et Valls) lâchent les voyous de Tel Aviv, refusent leur chantage perpétuel et les mettent au ban du monde civilisé. Excellentes nouvelles"
- sofiane El abed (07/04/2015 - 07h46)
"[...] l'existence de ce pays est créé sur des terres palestiniennes donc ce pays n'a aucune légitimité et n'a aucun avenir sur le long terme..... Ces gens partiront comme ils sont venus ...."
- Teddy Galant (07/04/2015 - 09h12)
"Et oui, même les USA ont enfin compris a qui ils avaient à faire. Les derniers développements sont excellents pour la paix au moyen orient. Il faut dire qu'il était incompréhensible que cette grande démocratie (les États Unis), accepte encore plus longtemps de cautionner ce petit État voyou (colonisation et apartheid)."

*************************************

Histoire

- L’image manquante de Vienne sous le Reich, Joëlle Stolz (Le Monde) - "Ces images en disent long sur la virulence de l’antisémitisme à cette époque. Des historiens ont établi que les Autrichiens, qui représentaient 8 % de la population du Reich, ont formé 14 % des effectifs de la Waffen-SS, 40 % du personnel des camps d’extermination et jusqu’à 70 % de ceux qui assuraient la logistique de la Shoah".
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/04/02/l-image-manquante-de-vienne-sous-le-reich_4608445_3214.html
"[...] Ce fragment de prise de vues, unique en son genre, montre une scène typique des journées qui ont suivi l’Anschluss, l’annexion par l’Allemagne hitlérienne, en mars 1938 : deux jeunes juifs viennois sont contraints de frotter le pavé à quatre pattes, devant une foule qui se délecte de leur humiliation. Sous la pression des troupes allemandes, et dans l’illusion que le Troisième Reich allait apporter du travail, la grande majorité de la population a approuvé l’Anschluss. En quelques heures, même dans les HLM qui arboraient jadis, chaque 1er mai, les drapeaux rouges de la social-démocratie, Vienne se couvrit de croix gammées. Les premiers à sentir que le vent de l’Histoire avait tourné furent les 200 000 juifs qui avaient contribué à l’épanouissement de la ville. Les antisémites viennois se livrèrent à des pillages et autres débordements, auxquels les nouveaux maîtres nazis mirent bon ordre après quelques jours.
Montée en boucle sur dix-sept secondes, la brève séquence de The Missing Image est terrible. On voit le regard traqué des hommes agenouillés sur le trottoir, leurs mains soignées de bourgeois ou d’intellectuel. Autour d’eux, parmi les badauds hilares, Ruth Beckermann s’attache à trois visages : deux femmes dont la coiffure et les vêtements trahissent les origines populaires, ainsi qu'une troisième, une Juive aux cheveux courts et au manteau élégant, souriant d'un air confus, à qui un homme en uniforme donne un balai pour qu'elle aussi nettoie le pavé.
Ces images en disent long sur la virulence de l’antisémitisme à cette époque. Des historiens ont établi que les Autrichiens, qui représentaient 8 % de la population du Reich, ont formé 14 % des effectifs de la Waffen-SS, 40 % du personnel des camps d’extermination et jusqu’à 70 % de ceux qui assuraient la logistique de la Shoah. [...]"

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