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30 octobre 2015 5 30 /10 /octobre /2015 21:45

Intifada ?

- Jérusalem : nouvelle attaque au couteau (AFP) - "Un Palestinien a blessé au couteau au moins deux civils vendredi à Jérusalem et a été "neutralisé" par des tirs israéliens lors du premier attentat anti-israélien depuis des jours à Jérusalem".
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/10/30/97001-20151030FILWWW00157-jerusalem-nouvelle-attaque-au-couteau.php
- Deux blessés dans une attaque à Jérusalem ; le terroriste neutralisé (Times of Israel) - "L’incident est survenu près de la station de tramway sur la rue Bar Lev dans le quartier de la colline des Munitions. Selon les premiers rapports, le terroriste s’est jeté sur les passants et a réussi à blesser deux personnes".
http://fr.timesofisrael.com/deux-blesses-dans-une-attaque-a-jerusalem-le-terroriste-neutralise/

- Cisjordanie : 2 Palestiniens attaquent au couteau des policiers israéliens (AFP) - "Les deux Palestiniens ont agressé les gardes-frontières en faction à l'intersection de Tappuah".
https://fr.news.yahoo.com/cisjordanie-2-palestiniens-attaquent-au-couteau-policiers-isra%C3%A9liens-110944871.html

- 3 attentats au couteau après l'appel du Hamas à une "journée de colère" (i24) - "Dans un communiqué publié jeudi, l'organisation terroriste a rendu hommage aux "actions héroïques" des jeunes Palestiniens soulignant que "les ennemis comprennent uniquement le langage de la force". Parallèlement, Ismaïl Haniyeh, le chef du Hamas à Gaza, a exhorté le président de l'Autorité palestinienne Mahmoud Abbas à réactiver l'Organisation de Libération de la Palestine (OLP) et à agir pour préserver ce qu'il appelle "l'intifada Al-Quds"."
http://www.i24news.tv/fr/actu/israel/diplomatie-defense/90802-151030-le-hamas-appelle-a-une-journee-de-la-colere-ce-vendredi-en-cisjordanie

- PA: Palestinian baby dies from inhaling tear gas fired by IDF (Times of Israel) - "8-month-old boy was at home near Bethlehem when he died of asphyxiation, PA health ministry says; army investigating".
http://www.timesofisrael.com/pa-palestinian-baby-dies-from-inhaling-tear-gas-fired-by-idf/

- Les Palestiniens pressent la CPI d'"accélérer" l'examen de "crimes de guerre israéliens" (AFP) - "M. al-Malki a en outre remis à la procureure Fatou Bensouda, à La Haye, un dossier de 52 pages concernant des "exécutions extra-judiciaires" et des "destructions de maisons" commises selon lui par Israël lors des 40 derniers jours".
https://fr.news.yahoo.com/palestiniens-pressent-cpi-d-acc%C3%A9l%C3%A9rer-lexamen-crimes-guerre-181920833.html
- Les Palestiniens accusent Israël de « nettoyage ethnique » devant la CPI (AFP) - "Le numéro deux de l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP), Saëb Erekat, a indiqué dans un communiqué que le dossier évoque également un « nettoyage ethnique » et s’appuie sur « des photos et des vidéos vérifiées »."
http://fr.timesofisrael.com/les-palestiniens-accusent-israel-de-nettoyage-ethnique-devant-la-cpi/

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Israël

- Netanyahou revient sur ses propos concernant le rôle du Mufti dans la Shoah (i24) - "Mes remarques étaient destinés à illustrer l'approche meurtrière du Mufti à l'encontre des Juifs dans ses contacts étroits avec les dirigeants nazis. Contrairement à l'impression qui s'est diffusé, je ne voulais pas prétendre que, dans sa conversation avec Hitler en novembre 1941, le Mufti l'a convaincu d'adopter la solution finale".
http://www.i24news.tv/fr/actu/israel/90865-151030-netanyahou-revient-sur-ses-propos-concernant-le-role-du-mufti-dans-la-shoah
"Le Premier ministre israélien Benyamin Netanyahou est revenu vendredi sur ses propos controversés concernant le rôle présumé du mufti de Jérusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini dans la décision des dirigeants nazis d'exterminer les Juifs européens, dans un message publié sur Facebook.
"Je tiens à clarifier mes propos concernant les liens entre le Mufti Hadj Amin al-Husseini et les nazis", a indiqué Netanyahou. "En aucune manière, je n'ai eu l'intention d'absoudre Hitler de sa responsabilité à l'égard de la Shoah. Hitler et les dirigeants nazis sont responsables du meurtre de six millions de Juifs", a-t-il écrit dans son message.
Alors que Netanyahou avait affirmé la semaine dernière que c'est le Mufti de Jérusalem qui avait soufflé l'idée de la solution finale à Hitler, le Premier ministre a précisé dans son message de vendredi que "la décision de passer d'une politique de déportation des Juifs à la solution finale a été prise par les nazis et n'a dépendu d'aucune influence extérieure". "Les nazis ont vu dans le Mufti un collaborateur, mais ils n'ont pas eu besoin de lui pour décider la destruction systématique des Juifs d'Europe, qui a débuté en juin 1941", a-t-il insisté.
"Mes remarques étaient destinés à illustrer l'approche meurtrière du Mufti à l'encontre des Juifs dans ses contacts étroits avec les dirigeants nazis. Contrairement à l'impression qui s'est diffusé, je ne voulais pas prétendre que, dans sa conversation avec Hitler en novembre 1941, le Mufti l'a convaincu d'adopter la solution finale. Les nazis l'ont décidé tout seul", a ajouté Netanyahou, dans une tentative de clarifier ses propos qui ont défrayé la chronique dans le monde entier il y a près de 10 jours. Le Premier ministre israélien a ajouté qu'il était "absurde" de considérer que ses propos visaient à absoudre les nazis de leur rôle dans l'Holocauste."

- Entretien avec Isaac Herzog (leader de l'opposition travailliste), Piotr Smolar (Le Monde) - "Je pense que l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien est très problématique et que Rabin aurait été d’accord. Je pense que le mouvement BDS est une menace existentielle pour notre légitimité et notre juste cause dans ce monde. Je veux m’assurer que notre nation a un Etat indépendant qui est la destination du peuple juif, à côté d’un Etat palestinien qui est la destination du peuple palestinien".
http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2015/10/30/nous-devons-aller-vers-une-separation-d-avec-les-palestiniens_4800242_3218.html
"- Piotr Smolar : Comment l’assassinat [du premier ministre israélien Yitzhak Rabin] a-t-il changé la gauche ?
- Isaac Herzog : Cet événement a d’abord bouleversé le pays et provoqué un grand tournant dans la politique. Ce n’est pas seulement l’assassinat qui a conduit à l’affaiblissement de la gauche, mais les circonstances historiques. Le terrorisme et les attentats-suicides dans les années 1990 et au début des années 2000 ont influencé de façon dramatique la psyché nationale. Mais, d’un autre côté, cela a conforté l’héritage de Rabin. Paradoxalement, après lui, tous les leaders ont été forcés d’aller dans le sens d’arrangements avec les Palestiniens. Tous ceux qui s’étaient opposés à la politique de Rabin l’ont adoptée. Benjamin Nétanyahou, Ehoud Barak avec les négociations de Camp David, Ariel Sharon et le retrait unilatéral dramatique de la bande de Gaza, Ehoud Olmert qui est allé aussi loin que possible avec Mahmoud Abbas... D’une certaine façon, ils sont tous allés dans le sens d’une solution à deux Etats, malgré le fait que, dans l’opinion publique, elle avait perdu substantiellement du soutien avec la vague de terreur. [...]
- Certes, mais sur des sujets majeurs comme le terrorisme, le dossier nucléaire iranien ou bien le mouvement BDS, appelant au boycottage d’Israël à cause de l’occupation, il est souvent difficile de distinguer vos positions de celles de la droite. Pourquoi ?
- Parce que nous y croyons ! Quand il s’agit de sécurité nationale, je ne serai jamais dans l’opposition aux citoyens israéliens. Je pense que l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien est très problématique et que Rabin aurait été d’accord. Je pense que le mouvement BDS est une menace existentielle pour notre légitimité et notre juste cause dans ce monde. Je veux m’assurer que notre nation a un Etat indépendant qui est la destination du peuple juif, à côté d’un Etat palestinien qui est la destination du peuple palestinien. J’ai aussi clairement fait comprendre à mon parti et à nos supporters qu’il fallait que nous allions vers le centre, car nous n’emporterons jamais la confiance des Israéliens si nous ne touchons pas leur cœur en matière de sécurité. Depuis des années, la droite nous accuse d’être des traîtres et d’avoir laissé tomber les questions de sécurité. [...]
- Croyez-vous Benyamin Nétanyahou lorsqu’il affirme vouloir préserver le statu quo au sujet de l’accès à l’Esplanade des mosquées (mont du Temple pour les juifs) ?
- Ça n’a rien à voir avec la croyance. Israël a toujours voulu, sans équivoque, préserver le statu quo sur le mont du Temple, et ce gouvernement aussi. D’énormes mensonges sont diffusés par les affiliés des Frères musulmans en Israël et ailleurs, sur ce sujet, qui a toujours fait couler le sang. Je crois dans le droit de chacun à pratiquer sa religion. Je crois aussi dans la prudence, basée sur des décisions religieuses [rabbiniques] au sujet des visites des juifs sur le mont du Temple."

- Le pape déclare : «Nier le droit d'exister d'Israel, c'est de l'antisémitisme» (Le Temps) - "A Ronald S. Lauder, le président du Congrès juif mondial, le pape déclare: «Attaquer des juifs c’est de l’antisémitisme, mais une attaque contre l’État d’Israël est aussi de l’antisémitisme. Il y a peut-être des désaccords politiques entre les gouvernements sur des enjeux politiques, mais l’État d’Israël a tous les droits d’exister en sécurité et en prospérité.»"
http://www.letemps.ch/monde/2015/10/30/pape-declare-nier-droit-exister-israel-c-antisemitisme

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Gaza & Hamas

- By the way, Israel is bussing hundreds of Gazans to pray in Jerusalem weekly (Elder of Ziyon) - "This has been the norm for a few months now".
http://elderofziyon.blogspot.fr/2015/10/by-way-israel-is-bussing-hundreds-of.html

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Diplomatie

- Dennis Ross: US must move from distance to detente with Israel, Eric Cortellessa (Times of Israel) - très intéressant entretien sur la situation diplomatique israélo-américaine avec un de ses meilleurs connaisseurs. C'est aussi une très bonne occasion de revenir sur le détail de l'échec des dernières tentatives de relancer le "processus de paix", dont Dennis Ross était un des acteurs majeurs.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/dennis-ross-us-must-move-from-distance-to-detente-with-israel/
"[...] “There is a remarkable continuity over the concern that too close a relationship with Israel will harm US ties with the Arabs, so there is always a constituency in each administration that feels the US needs to create distance with Israel to gain responsiveness from the Arab world,” said Ross, who most recently worked in the Obama administration as an adviser on the Middle East. That historical perspective sits at the core of Ross’s new book, “Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama,” which provides a history of the relationship, deconstructing each administration’s policies on the Jewish state. [...]
- What do you make of the current violence in Israel, this wave of terror?
- Well, I think those who are saying it’s another intifada are wrong. The first two intifadas were organized. In the First Intifada, you had the children of the stones, but you also had the Tanzim [the militant faction of the Fatah movement] that really guided the destruction. The truth of the Second Intifada is that [former Palestinian Authority President Yasser] Arafat was behind it to begin with. There was a kind of infrastructure that was behind it, and that’s not the case here.
- What do you think is Mahmoud Abbas’s role?
- Abu Mazen hasn’t helped with the things he’s said, and he’s added to the image that’s out there, to the narrative that’s out there, that the Israelis are going to change the status quo at the Temple Mount. And that’s completely fallacious. It’s just — it’s a lie.
But it has taken on a life of its own, and that requires a dedicated effort on the part of Palestinian leadership to say, “It’s completely untrue.” But they’ve refused to do that and we need to get the Palestinians to say very clearly, “That’s not happening.” Whether that could bring this to an end, I don’t know.
- What was your response when Secretary of State John Kerry began linking frustration over settlements to the violence?
- It was a mistake to say that. It was a mistake because it implies that if tomorrow there were no settlements, this issue would be solved. Really? Is that what’s driving them? The idea that there is frustration against Israelis is true. But there is also frustration against their own leadership. There’s anger that the other Arabs are not paying attention to them. There’s frustration over unemployment. There’s a lot of things affecting Palestinians. And when Kerry said that, it looks like he’s trying to make an alternative explanation or an excuse.
- In your book you say that is a tendency of the Obama administration.
- Yeah, one of the problems is that the president has been very good when it comes to security issues, but because he looks at the Palestinians as being weak, there is this reluctance to criticize them. “They’re too weak to criticize” is what I say in the Obama chapter. And if they are too weak to criticize, they are too weak to be held accountable, too weak to be responsible. They’re too weak to have a state. Well, if you want the Palestinians to have the responsibility of a state, you have to hold them responsible.
Now Kerry’s statement has been walked back, and that’s good. But I’m afraid that it reflects a kind of instinct. The first instinct, instead of criticizing this for what it is, is to want to look for another explanation. And I have a problem with that.
That doesn’t mean that I don’t think having a stalemate [in peace negotiations] is something you can take comfort in as never producing these kinds of explosions. But I think, first things first, when something like this happens, you have to say, “This is wrong.” You have to let them know that terror is never acceptable under any circumstances, and that this is going to get the Palestinians nothing.
- There’s an old diplomatic adage, “Never waste a crisis.” Do you see a way to take this crisis and turn it into an opportunity?
- I don’t know, because I think part of the problem is that there’s such a high level of disbelief. I have worried about and said publicly that the greatest single problem we have is the growing disbelief on the part of Israelis and Palestinians, alike, in the other, and the purposes of the other.
But the American approach ought to recognize the choices are not binary between solving everything or doing nothing. We should be focused on how do you work to diffuse tension? How do you begin to create some sense of belief again on each side? How do you change the realities on the ground? And how do you create the conditions for peacemaking? Because they don’t exist today.
- Shifting to President Obama, you say in the book is that there has always been a debate within each president’s administration about whether the US needs to distance itself from Israel to gain responsiveness from the Arab world. And you make the point that Obama made a very deliberate decision to take the approach of distance.
- When the president comes in, he thinks we have a major problem with Arabs and Muslims. And he sees that as a function of the Bush administration – an image, fairly or not, that Bush was at war with Islam. So one of the ways that he wants to show that he’s going to have an outreach to the Muslim world is that he’s going to give this speech in Cairo.
So he wants to reach out and show that the US is not so close to the Israelis, which he thinks also feeds this perception. That’s why there’s an impulse to do some distancing from Israel, and that’s why the settlement issue is seized in a way. Now, I had no problem with saying we should limit settlement activity. But the idea that there should be a complete settlement freeze, including natural growth, was a mistake.
- Why, exactly?
- Well, I was in the State Department at that time and was working on Iran. But the president asked me about it. When [then US special envoy for Middle East Peace George] Mitchell and I go to brief him for a meeting with Bibi, Mitchell lays out the key to the meeting, which was to get the settlement freeze. The president then asked me what I thought, and I said, “You’re asking Bibi to do what none of his predecessors have done. He’s the head of a right-center government and he’s supposed to do what none of the Labor prime ministers have done? What’s he supposed to say? How’s he supposed to justify that?”
The reason why a limitation on settlement activity was preferable was because it was something we could define. A complete freeze puts us in a position where we’re framing an objective we couldn’t achieve. Part of the appeal of the settlement freeze to the president was that it was a way he can show distance from the Israelis in a way that also mattered to the Arabs. And that’s one thing if you can deliver it, but if you can’t, you’re actually worse off.
- Do you think there was also a miscalculation of the Palestinian political dynamic? Because the settlement freeze was imposed by the US and not delivered through Abbas, he couldn’t sell it as a Palestinian victory, so he still looked weak in the eyes of Palestinians.
- Not only that. Abbas is then the one who says, “The Americans put me up a tree. I never said that this was a condition. The Americans created this condition.” Now it wasn’t true that we made it a condition for negotiations. That wasn’t true. But by putting it out there publicly the way we did, how can Abu Mazen go into negotiations when we haven’t produced this? So it became an excuse for him. He didn’t have to do anything until we delivered this.
- You talk in the book about the implications of Obama calling settlements “illegitimate” in the Cairo speech. You say you told him later not to use that term because, while past administrations recognized settlements as a political problem, they wouldn’t call them “illegitimate” because it undercuts the American negotiating position, which is that they’re seeking to keep the major settlement blocs in place with mutually-agreed land swaps.
- That’s right. The first time I raised that issue to the president it was news to him because it really had not been raised to him before. He used that language in the Cairo speech and I said this to him afterword, in July when I got there. He understands that every administration has had a problem with settlements, which is true. But he doesn’t know that this kind of terminology is really different.
Since the Reagan administration, the US made a policy that settlements were a political issue and not a legal issue. So he doesn’t use that term in future meetings, but he does put it back in for one of his UN speeches. When I raised an objection, Dennis McDonough [then deputy national security adviser] says he can’t look like he’s retreating. But Obama is much more careful about it himself after that conversation.
- What’s your diagnosis of the Bibi-Obama relationship?
- Well their meetings would almost always be quite good — at a high level, serious, thoughtful. The problem would always emerge afterword, when one or the other would do something that would make the other feel betrayed over what had been in the meeting itself. So that contributed over time to a kind of mutual distrust.
The other thing is that they have different worldviews. I mean they have fundamentally different worldviews. To give you an illustration, even though the president says this is a transaction and not a transformation with Iran, I think he believes that this deal will not only constrain the Iranian program in a real way that has not been achieved until now, but more than that, it will be empowering, at least potentially, the more pragmatic forces within Iran and those around [Iranian President Hassan] Rouhani.
Netanyahu sees this as empowering Iran to do more in the region. In effect, I see them each as seeing this deal as a potential game changer, but they define the game very differently. Obama sees the game as being changed because you may be able to alter the reality within Iran, which will change their behavior over time in the region for the better.
Now I think people tend to focus too much on the personal side, and I’m not saying the personal side doesn’t matter, but for me, as I’ve pointed out, we’ve had previous periods where presidents and prime ministers have had real problems personally.
- What are your thoughts on the Iran deal now that it’s done?
- The deal itself buys you 15 years. One of my main concerns is what happens after year 15, when they basically can have as large a program as they want, and the gap between threshold status and weapon status becomes very small. To deal with that vulnerability you have to bolster your deterrence in a way that convinces them there is a firewall between threshold status and weapons status. They have to be convinced of that. The more you make it clear that for any misbehavior they pay a price, and it’s the kind of price that matters to them, the more likely they are to realize the firewall is real, and the less likely they are to ever test it.
I would like to see us do things that to create that firewall and the legitimacy of it in the eyes of the rest of the world. So if [Iran] is going to dash toward a weapon the answer is not sanctions, it’s force. And everybody knows that and accepts that, and it becomes legitimate.
- Are you worried about the deal’s implementation?
- Well, I would like to see a joint consultative committee between the United States and Israel on the implementation. That’s not to replace what’s done with the other members [of the P5+1], but because the Israelis will be looking at everything with a microscope, I think it would be reassuring to the Israelis and it would send a message that we are really going to hold the Iranians to what they are obligated to do.
But I would also like that committee to be a forum for contingency planning to deal with options for when the Iranians ratchet up what they will do in the region. We’re already seeing them ratchet it up in Syria. Everyone is focusing on what the Russians are doing, but Iran is adding significant numbers of Revolutionary Guard forces to the ground, it’s not just Hezbollah forces. I think this is a harbinger of things to come.
- Given given the nature and intensity of the divide between the US and Israel on this deal, there has been a lot of rhetoric saying this moment is the worst in the U.S.-Israel alliance —
- It’s not.
- That’s what I wanted to ask you about. You write in the book about other moments that were considerably worse, during the Eisenhower administration, the Reagan administration after the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 —
- This is the lowest point since the siege of Beirut and then Sabra-Shatila. I mean, look, Reagan threatens the future of the relationship. Reagan, who has an emotional connection. Eisenhower actually contemplates the use of force against the Israelis to get the IDF out of the Sinai. So people who are saying this is the lowest point don’t know the history.
One of the reasons for writing the book is to put everything in perspective, but also to draw the lessons from the past, to apply them to the next administration. Because so many of the assumptions are where we have always started off. This whole issue of distancing. I mean, it’s embedded in the psychology of every administration, at least a significant constituency of every administration, without really seeing the constant pattern that this is not what drives Arab behavior toward the United States. [...]
- Being in the early stages of a presidential election, candidates are starting to flesh out their policy views toward Israel. What’s the biggest reason they should see a close relationship with Israel as a strategic asset for the United States?
- Because distancing the US from Israel has never achieved the objective of bringing the US closer to Arabs. Our relationship to Israel is not what drives their behavior toward us. But the best case is to look at the region. The state system is under assault. The character of conflict is over the most fundamental thing it can be over – identity and who is going to be able to define it. We need one pillar of democracy and stability in that region, given all the uncertainty, all the conflicts and the terrible nature of those conflicts, of the turmoil we are going to see. Israel is that one pillar."

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Egypte

- Egyptian TV Host and Historian Concur: Burning Is the Only Solution for the Jews (Al-Rahma TV, 27 octobre, Vidéo 1mn52) - ""The history of the Jews has been black since the dawn of time," said Khaled. "Nebuchadnezzar burned them, the Crusaders burned them, and even Hitler and Nazism burned them. Is burning the only solution for the Jews?" he asked. "So it seems. So it seems," Zidan concurred".
http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/5136.htm

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Syrie

- Au moins 57 morts en Syrie après le tirs de missiles par l'armée (Reuters) - "sur un marché d'une ville proche de Damas".
https://fr.news.yahoo.com/des-tirs-missiles-pr%C3%A8s-damas-font-au-moins-085739438.html

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Points de vue

- We are lifelong Zionists. Here’s why we’ve chosen to boycott Israel, Steven Levitsky & Glen Weyl (Washington Post) - "The only tools that could plausibly shape Israeli strategic calculations are a withdrawal of U.S. aid and diplomatic support, and boycotts of and divestitures from the Israeli economy. Boycotting only goods produced in settlements would not have sufficient impact to induce Israelis to rethink the status quo"; "We recognize that some boycott advocates are driven by opposition to (and even hatred of) Israel. Our motivation is precisely the opposite: love for Israel and a desire to save it".
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-zionist-case-for-boycotting-israel/2015/10/23/ac4dab80-735c-11e5-9cbb-790369643cf9_story.html

- If you love Israel, don’t boycott it, Elliott Abrams (senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations) - "To them, Palestinians are apparently like small children, unable to reason or control their actions. They are not players in this drama. Only Jews are".
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/if-you-love-israel-dont-boycott-it/2015/10/26/5bb6c4fe-7c0d-11e5-beba-927fd8634498_story.html
"We love Israel. We love it more than we love other nations. That’s why we must do all we can to destroy its economy.
That is the message of the bizarre Oct. 25 Sunday Opinion column by professors Steven Levitsky and Glen Weyl. Their argument is simple: Israel’s “occupation” of the West Bank and Gaza is now “permanent,” unless sufficient economic damage is done to force Israel to change course.
What’s missing here? Two things: history and Palestinians.
History reveals two recent attempts by Israeli leaders to negotiate a comprehensive peace with the Palestinians — by prime ministers Ehud Barak in 2000 and Ehud Olmert in 2008 — which were rejected by Palestine Liberation Organization leaders Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas. Of this, Levitsky and Weyl say nothing. They also do not mention Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, seeming to regard it as “occupied” even though not a single Israeli soldier or civilian lives there.
Instead, they simply claim that “domestic movements” in Israel to avoid “making the occupation permanent” have “withered.” Now, it is obvious that the Israeli left, and the “peace movement” there, have been weakened. Why might that be? The professors, self-styled “progressives,” tell us it is “thanks to an economic boom and the temporary security provided by the West Bank barrier and the Iron Dome missile defense system.” This shows a deep lack of understanding of Israel and Israelis, for the “peace movement” has “withered,” all right — but for a very different reason.
This reason is the conduct of Palestinians, a factor that is almost entirely absent from the professors’ account. This is remarkable. The Palestinian refusal of negotiations is not mentioned. The waves of terror — from Arafat’s intifadas to today’s stabbings — are barely mentioned. The only mention of the Palestinians’ rationale is this: “the occupation itself . . . crucially, remains the principal motive behind Palestinian violence.”
Really? The “occupation” began in 1967. Was there no Palestinian violence before that? What of the decades of Palestinian terrorism meant to stop Jews from coming to Israel and from establishing their state, and then continuing from 1948 to 1967? Sadly, Palestinian “violence,” which the professors scrupulously avoid calling terrorism, long predated the “occupation.” The fundamental problem is the widespread Palestinian rejection not of Israeli settlements but of the existence of the state of Israel.
Particularly striking is what the professors demand of Palestinians: nothing. They do not demand that the Palestinians negotiate. They do not even demand an end to terrorism, not even during a month of terror by stabbing — the most intimate form of killing imaginable. To them, Palestinians are apparently like small children, unable to reason or control their actions. They are not players in this drama. Only Jews are.
The final words in the professors’ commentary speak again of love: While some people boycott Israel out of hatred, they will do it out of “love for Israel and the desire to save it.” In taking this position, they reject the views of the vast majority of “progressive” Israelis they claim to support and align themselves with every enemy of the Jewish state. They are of course free to do this, but they should be more candid with us — and with themselves. They are trying to destroy Israel to save it, from Cambridge and Chicago, while Israelis face dangers every day. One such danger is terrorism. Another, we can see, is foolish professors whose intellectual pretensions lead them to ignore history and infantilize Palestinians."

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